

Proposal of a Double Diamond Model of Social Response

Paul R. Nail
University of Central Arkansas

Stefano I. Di Domenico and Geoff MacDonald
University of Toronto

Models of social response concern the identification and delineation of possible responses to social pressure. Previous efforts toward a unified model have been limited to conceptualizations that define conformity and its alternatives based on discrete categories (e.g., Montgomery, 1992; Nail et al., 2000). Social response in many settings, however, is more a matter of degree, requiring continuous-response formats. The authors propose a new unified model, the *double diamond*, which was derived from a synthesis of 11 existing models. To our knowledge, it includes for the first time in a continuous-response model: two types of conformity, three types of anticonformity, independence, compromise, contagion, and numerous other possibilities. The model provides a needed theoretical foundation for a relatively new influence technique: *strategic self-anticonformity* (MacDonald et al., 2011). The broader integrative power of the model is illustrated by its links with the *true self* (Rogers, 1951), *self-determination theory* (Ryan & Deci, 2008), and two therapeutic techniques—*paradoxical intention* (Frankl, 1967) and *motivational interviewing* (Miller & Rollnick, 2002).

Keywords: social influence, conformity, independence, anticonformity, self-determination theory, paradoxical intention

Shawn is in the tenth grade and is taking physics under Mr. Benson. Shawn is extremely bright but something less than 100% motivated in this class. Shawn's older sister is in the same class and has had the highest score on every test so far this semester. Shawn's performance lags behind in the B+ to A- range. Mr. Benson has seen Shawn's aptitude scores and knows that he has the ability to make an A+. Mr. Benson's direct attempts to encourage and motivate Shawn to work harder, however, have proven unsuccessful. At this point, he tells Shawn that there was a time when he thought that Shawn might have as much ability as his sister, maybe more, but now he knows that this conjecture is incorrect. He knows to expect above average performance from Shawn, but he also knows that Shawn will "forever be in his sister's shadow." Shawn gets angry and decides he will show Mr. Benson a thing or two; Shawn begins studying physics with a passion. He completes every assignment on time and to the best of his ability. The harder Shawn works, the more he seems to enjoy physics. Shawn's marks dramatically improve. He finishes the course ranked second, just behind his older sister. Mr. Benson's revised strategy to motivate Shawn worked.

As social psychologists with special interests in interpersonal influence, some of our main concerns in cases like the above are in identifying and classifying both the responses of the influencee,

Shawn, as well as the strategies of the influencer, Mr. Benson. We are also concerned with the psychological processes that might mediate and explain why influencees and influencers are motivated to behave as they do in such cases. In the present article, we lay out a descriptive model of social response that is the first in the social influence literature to be able to account for the full range of possibilities pointed to by cases such as Shawn's.

Models of social response is the specific subfield of social psychology that addresses the issue of describing responses to social influence (e.g., Allen, 1965; Allport, 1934; Crutchfield, 1962; Festinger, 1953; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Jahoda, 1956; MacDonald, Nail, & Harper, 2011; Montgomery, 1992; Nail, 1986; Nail & MacDonald, 2007; Nail, MacDonald, & Levy, 2000; Packer & Miners, 2012; Willis, 1965a). A basic goal of theorists and researchers in this vein is to identify the minimum number of conceptual and operational variables that is needed to adequately distinguish between responses such as conformity, independence, and anticonformity. The four generally recognized goals of science and technology are description, prediction, explanation, and application. Social response models are concerned primarily with the first of these goals. Nevertheless, the goal of description is of critical importance because it seems unlikely that consistently accurate predictions can be made, that a range of phenomena will become well understood, or that useful applications will be created in the absence of precise and accurate description (Hollander & Willis, 1967; Nail & MacDonald, 2007). The frequent confusion between *conformity* and closely related but patently different types of successful influence (i.e., *contagion*) argues strongly for the value of response models that are nuanced and explicitly descriptive in their approach (see Nail et al., 2000, pp. 460–461).

Even though the social response models literature has remained active for many years, no completely adequate system has yet been proposed. Specifically, none of the extant models includes all

Paul R. Nail, University of Central Arkansas; Stefano I. Di Domenico and Geoff MacDonald, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

We thank Mark Zanna and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful and constructive comments on a previous draft.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paul R. Nail, Department of Psychology and Counseling, University of Central Arkansas, 201 Donaghey Avenue, Conway, AR 72035. E-mail: pnail@uca.edu

response possibilities that are generally recognized as theoretically significant and conceptually distinct. The models of Argyle (1957), Crutchfield (1962), Willis (1963), and Willis and Levine (1976), for example, include *conformity*, *independence*, and *anti-conformity* (i.e., positive influence, no influence, and negative influence, respectively), but they do not provide for the distinction between two important types of conformity, *conversion* and *compliance* (MacDonald, Nail, & Levy, 2004; Nail et al., 2000). Conversion refers to conformity both publicly and privately vis-à-vis the influence source (e.g., Brehm & Mann, 1975; Eagly, Wood, & Fishbaugh, 1981; Gerard, 1954; Halama & Lačná, 2011; Rohrer, Baron, Hoffman, & Swander, 1954; Sherif, 1935). In contrast, *compliance* refers to conformity only at the public level (e.g., Asch, 1951; Baron, Vandello, & Brunsmann, 1996; Coch & French, 1948; Wright, Mathews, & Skagerberg, 2005). The influencee's outward behavior is affected but not her or his internal beliefs and attitudes. The models of Allen (1965), Festinger (1953), and Kelman (1958) all provide for the distinction between conversion and compliance, but they do not accommodate anticonformity.

This is not to say that the response models literature is in disarray or that no progress has been made. On the contrary, early work by Crutchfield (1962) and Willis (1963) demonstrated that two conceptual dimensions are necessary to adequately distinguish between conformity, independence, and anticonformity. Previously, these responses had been conceptualized only as different points on a unidimensional continuum (Argyle, 1957; Willis, 1965, September). As another example, Hogg and Turner's (1987) theory of *referent informational influence* elegantly explains conformity, independence, and anticonformity based on a single social-cognitive construct: *self-categorization*. In essence, conformity results when a person identifies with the group in question as an in-group, independence when one does not identify with the group as an in-group, and anticonformity when one disidentifies with (or reacts against) the group as an out-group (e.g., Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Eagly et al., 1981; Feshbach, 1967; Nail et al., 2000).

More recently, the work of Nail and colleagues (e.g., MacDonald et al., 2004; Nail & MacDonald, 2007; Nail et al., 2000) has made progress toward a unified response model, while providing for increased coherence and integration of the social influence literature as a whole. The MacDonald et al. (2004) *social response context model* (SRCM), for example, provides for 16 responses to influence (or influence processes), including conversion, compliance, contagion, independence, and anticonformity, with a single set of constructs. What is more, the SRCM shows the interface between these responses and much of the broader social psychological literature, accommodating such wide-ranging phenomena as cognitive dissonance, culture and aggression, riots, self-persuasion, group norms, group therapy, prejudice, impression management, pluralistic ignorance, bystander intervention/nonintervention, close relationships, and implicit attitudes (see also Nail & MacDonald, 2007; Nail et al., 2000).

To our knowledge, however, all efforts toward a unified response model since Nail & Van Leeuwen (1993) have been limited to conceptualizations that define conformity and its alternatives based on discrete categories (i.e., preinfluence/postinfluence, agreement/disagreement, public/private; e.g., MacDonald et al., 2004; Nail & MacDonald, 2007; Nail et al., 2000; see also; Montgomery, 1992). This is less than ideal because social influence in many real-world and

laboratory settings is more a matter of degree, which requires *continuous-response dimensions*. Furthermore, discrete categories automatically exclude theoretically important types of response such as *compromise* (e.g., Asch, 1956; Chuang, Cheng, & Hsu, 2012; Hodges & Geyer, 2006), where an individual conforms to an intermediate degree in public while remaining independent at the private level. When a compromise response was available in the Asch (1956; Experiment 1) research, he found that 27.5% of all individual errors in the direction of an erroneous group norm reflected compromise rather than conformity.¹

Given these considerations, the purpose of this article is to propose a new unified model of social response that integrates all of the response types listed above (and more), but with continuous-response formats rather than discrete formats. We refer to the unified model as the *double diamond model*. We begin with further consideration of the case of Shawn, as it points to one of the novel responses generated by the double diamond model. Furthermore, this case makes salient some of the inherent subtleties and difficulties associated with classifying social responses, as well as how descriptive and explanatory levels of analysis can be complementary and therefore integrated. We turn next to a review of 11 extant social response models, because the double diamond model represents a synthesis of these models. Our review includes strengths and weaknesses of each model, factors that point ultimately to the need for a double diamond approach. The first model (Allen, 1965) is presented to illustrate a discrete-response model, which stands in contrast to the continuous-response format of the other 10 models. Next, we propose the double diamond model. We show how it integrates the existing response models, while pointing to new directions for theory and research. Specifically, the double diamond model not only accommodates virtually all patterns of social response previously identified in the literature, it also points to numerous response possibilities that have not yet been examined, demonstrated empirically, or discussed to our knowledge. We provide selected empirical evidence in support of the double diamond model and demonstrate its relevance in clinical settings by pointing to ties between it and two techniques of psychotherapy, *paradoxical intention* (Frankl, 1967) and *motivational interviewing* (Miller & Rollnick, 1991, 2002). These connections lead to a consideration of the double diamond model in relation to the *true self* (e.g., Horney, 1951; Rogers, 1951), as well as to self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2008). Finally, we consider weaknesses and strengths of the double dia-

¹ On each trial in Asch's (1951, 1956) research, subjects were to match the length of a standard line to one of three comparison lines, one of which was identical to the standard. Compromise was possible on only four of Asch's (1956, Experiment 1) 12 critical trials (#'s 3, 6, 9, and 12) because only on these trials did Asch's group of confederates endorse an extreme error from the standard, thus making an intermediate, or compromise, response possible. On these four trials, Asch (1956, Experiment 1) found compromise in 10% of subject responses, conformity in 26.2%, and independence in 63.8%. Considering all 12 critical trials, Asch found compromise in 3.3% of responses, conformity in 33.4%, and independence in 63.3%. Intriguingly, out of 984 total responses where movement away from the majority position was possible, Asch reported only one instance (0.10%). Considering the context of the Asch paradigm, this response could indicate anticonformity, but it might also indicate either subject or experimenter error.

mond model, as well as additional directions for future research and theoretical development.

Further Analysis of the Case of Shawn

Subtleties in Classifying Social Responses

How can Shawn's behavior in our opening example be classified? Recall that Shawn's teacher, Mr. Benson, was the influencer in this example. If we consider the events with respect to the *influencer's publicly stated positions*, Shawn's pattern of responses qualifies as a textbook case of *anticonformity* (Nail et al., 2000; Willis, 1965a; alias *counterconformity*, Hornsey, Smith, & Begg, 2007; or *counterformity*, Krech, Crutchfield, & Ballachey, 1962). Anticonformity occurs when the target of influence purposefully does the opposite of what the influence source indicates or suggests; thus, the target always ends up publicly disagreeing with the influence source, even if the target agrees with the source's position privately (Krech et al., 1962; Nail, 2009; Willis, 1965a).

Classifying social responses, however, is rarely as straightforward as it might seem. Consider the case of Shawn once more, but this time from the perspective of the influencer's, Mr. Benson's, *initial private intentions*. Here, ironically, Shawn's ultimate behavior indicates *conformity*. In the end, Shawn finished his physics course with a strong A just as Mr. Benson believed he could make all along. This case illustrates an important point regarding social response labels—to be accurate and to have clear meaning, response labels must always be given with respect to a *particular source of reference*. Anticonformity to one source can easily represent conformity to another; the rebellious teenager that anticonforms to her or his parents may at the same time be conforming to peers (Allen & Newton, 1972; Nail et al., 2000).

Social philosophers and commentators have recognized the relative nature of social response labels for many years. Thoreau (1854/1966) submitted that apparent nonconformists may simply be marching to the beat of a distant drummer. Similarly, Cooley (1902/1922) asserted that there is no clear distinction between conformity and nonconformity; thus, they should be examined and considered together as complementary forms of human behavior (see also Asch, 1961; Hodges & Geyer, 2006).

Integration Between the Descriptive and Explanatory Theoretical Levels

If we interpret Shawn's behavior as anticonformity, an important question concerns how such behavior can be explained in terms of intervening psychological processes. Social psychologists have proposed a number of motives that explain why anticonformity may occur (see Nail et al., 2000, p. 457). One, known as *psychological reactance*, is based on an individual's perceived rights and freedoms. Brehm (1966) posited that when people believe that their freedom to behave as they see fit is under threat, they often react by taking steps to restore that freedom. One clear way to reclaim a threatened freedom is to do the *opposite* of what the source of the threat suggests, that is, to anticonform. When Mr. Benson told Shawn that he would forever be in his sister's shadow, one way Shawn could restore his freedom and prove Mr. Benson wrong was to start studying harder and raise his grades. A motive besides psychological reactance may have been operating on Shawn as well, depending on his level of

anger and potential disliking for Mr. Benson because of Benson's criticism: It is psychologically consistent, dissonance-reducing, and rewarding to disagree with and prove wrong those whom one dislikes or with whom one disagrees. People are often motivated to disagree with "dissimilar, disliked, or unattractive others or with out-group members" (Heider, 1958; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Nail et al., 2000; e.g., Abrams et al., 1990, Study 2; Cooper & Jones, 1969; Wood, Pool, Leck, & Purvis, 1996).

It is noteworthy that *Homo sapiens* is not the only species, apparently, that is subject to reactance motivation. Erickson and Rossi (1975) reported an incident in which Erickson, as a boy, was watching his father as he attempted to lead a calf through an open barn door. The harder the elder Erickson pulled, however, the more the calf resisted. After the younger Erickson found humor in his father's predicament, the father challenged his son to do better. Straightaway, the boy took hold of the cow's tail and tried to pull the cow out of the doorway, back into the barnyard. The cow reacted by dragging the younger Erickson directly into the barn. We wonder what influence this incident might have had on Erickson growing up; he went on to become a psychiatrist and leading proponent of indirect approaches in psychotherapy. One such indirect approach, *paradoxical intention* (Frankl, 1967), is discussed below.

Strategic Self-Anticonformity

What about the influence strategy of the influencer, Mr. Benson, in the opening example? Note that Mr. Benson's second strategy also qualifies as a social response because he became an influencee when he changed his initial strategy *in response* to Shawn's initial noncompliance. In everyday language, Mr. Benson's second strategy fits in with a class of behaviors generally known as *reverse psychology* (Knowles & Riner, 2007; Sinha & Foscht, 2007). For reasons that will become clear shortly, however, we refer to such behavior more explicitly as *strategic self-anticonformity* (MacDonald et al., 2011). Shawn's initial noncompliance with Mr. Benson's suggestion that he should study harder apparently motivated Mr. Benson to change his influence strategy. To be successful, Mr. Benson publicly stated the opposite of his true private position and desire when he told Shawn that he would "forever be in his sister's shadow." Thus, Mr. Benson publicly anticonformed to his true private self for strategic reasons, hence the label, *strategic self-anticonformity*. In so doing, Mr. Benson showed that he had at least implicit knowledge of reactance motivation, as well as the interpersonal dynamics of some teenagers vis-à-vis authority figures (Allen & Newton, 1972; Nail, 2009). He turned this understanding to his, and ultimately Shawn's, advantage. As we demonstrate below, strategic self-anticonformity is not included by any extant response model. The failure to account for this and other related response possibilities is what necessitates the development of the double diamond model.

Review of Eleven Extant Social Response Models

Model 1: Allen (1965)

Allen's (1965) model assumes initial, or preinfluence, *private disagreement* between the target and source of influence. The model is formed by crossing two discrete variables: (a) the *public agreement or disagreement* between the target and source following exposure to an influence attempt (i.e., the postexposure public

response) and (b) the *private* agreement or disagreement between the target and source following exposure to influence (i.e., the postexposure private response). As can be seen in Figure 1, the model yields 2² or 4 response possibilities. *Conversion* is defined by the positive movement of the influence target at both the public and private levels; specifically, by post public and private agreement with the influence source. In contrast, *compliance* is defined by post public agreement between the target and source, but with continued disagreement in private; the target conforms publicly but not privately. *Independence* is defined by the absence of movement; specifically, by continued disagreement between the target and source both publicly and privately.

Allen (1965) did not label or discuss the fourth cell in his model, probably because he found no examples of this seemingly odd configuration in his literature review (viz., post public disagreement between the target and source accompanied post private agreement; the target conforms *privately* but not *publicly*). In more recent reviews, however, Nail and colleagues (MacDonald et al., 2004; Nail & MacDonald, 2007; Nail et al., 2000) have uncovered numerous examples (e.g., Abrams et al., 1990, Study 2; Doms & Van Avermaet, 1980; Eagly et al., 1981; Feshbach, 1967; Griskevicius, Goldstein, Mortensen, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006; Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974). This response seems to occur when targets of influence are moved by the content of a source's communication but are motivated, in the face of social pressure, to not reveal publicly that they have been so influenced. Nail et al. (2000) coined the label *paradoxical anti-compliance* to refer to this response possibility, suggesting a special and atypical type of anticonformity.

In providing for paradoxical anti-compliance, Allen's (1965) model illustrates how response models can aid in identifying new types of social response. A weakness of Allen's model, however, is that because of its defining framework and structure, it has no way of accommodating prototypical anticonformity where, like Shawn, influence targets display direct negative movement in response to the source's influence attempt. The model also excludes strategic self-anticonformity.

Model 1, Allen (1965)

		Post-exposure Public:	
		Agreement	Disagreement
Post-exposure Private:	Agreement	Conversion	Paradoxical Anti-compliance
	Disagreement	Compliance	Independence

Figure 1. The Allen (1965) response model. (From "Expanding the Scope of the Social Response Context Model" by G. MacDonald, P. R. Nail, and D. A. Levy, 2004, *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 26, p. 78. Copyright, 2004 by Taylor & Francis. Adapted by permission.)

Unidimensional Models: Models 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6

The five simplest continuous-response models and their primary proponents/originators are presented in Figure 2. Though similar, the models differ in significant ways. For example, Model 2 (Allport, 1934) defines *nonconformity* and *conformity* based on the single criterion *congruence* or *agreement* (i.e., the degree of postinfluence agreement between the target and source of influence). Conformity is represented by perfect postinfluence agreement, and deviations from this position represent different degrees of nonconformity. In contrast, Models 3, 4, 5, and 6 define responses on the basis of *movement* (i.e., pre- to postinfluence positive or negative change on the part of the influence target). Conformity, independence, and anticonformity are inferred in comparison to a control group not exposed to influence, which typically shows little or no movement one way or the other (e.g., Asch, 1951). In addition, Model 3 (Sherif, 1935), defines conformity on the basis of influencees' *decreased variability of responses* from pre- to postinfluence. Models 4 and 5 assume *initial private disagreement* between the target and source of influence, Model 6 *initial private agreement*. Models 2 and 3 assume either initial private agreement or disagreement.

Each of the models has its useful aspects. For example, the agreement criterion of Model 2, nonconformity–conformity, formed the basis of Allport's (1934) classic J-curve hypothesis of conformity. Nevertheless each of the models in Figure 2 has significant limitations (see Nail, 1986; Nail & Van Leeuwen, 1993; Willis, 1965, September). None of the models explicitly provides for the difference between public and private responding. Accordingly, the models do not distinguish between conversion and compliance as special types of conformity. They also fail to make the parallel distinction between *anticonversion* and *anticompliance* as special types of anticonformity (MacDonald et al., 2004; Nail & MacDonald, 2007). Anticonversion refers to anticonformity at both the public and private levels (e.g., Brehm & Mann, 1975; Nail et al., 2000). Anticompliance is more superficial; it is public anticonformity that is accompanied by private independence (Baer, Hinkle, Smith, & Fenton, 1980; Nail, Van Leeuwen, & Powell, 1996). These omissions are important because conversion and anticonversion have both been shown to be deeper in terms of their duration and cross-situational effects than mere compliance and anticompliance, respectively (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Festinger, 1953; Festinger & Aronson, 1968; Holzhausen & McGlynn, 2001; Kelman, 1958; MacDonald et al., 2004; Nail et al., 2000).²

² To be completely accurate, we need to point out that Asch did in fact directly address public versus private responding in one of his studies (Asch, 1956, Experiment 4). Under private responding, the error rate decreased by almost two-thirds, from 36.7% in public to only 12.5% in private. What is more, even in Asch's (1951) initial experiment, he did tap into the public/private dimension in his *qualitative analyses*—the interview data from his participants. By and large, these findings indicate that the conformity obtained by Asch reflects compliance rather than conversion. Compliance was most strongly indicated in Asch's *distortion of action* subjects. In essence, these subjects reported going along with the group even when they were aware that the group's judgments were incorrect. Research by Rohrer et al. (1954), which was based on Sherif's (1935) *autokinetic effect illusion paradigm*, likewise considered the public-private distinction, albeit indirectly. Rohrer et al. (1954) demonstrated that individual participants responded with what had been the laboratory group's evolved norm/judgment up to one year after the original group experience. This finding indicates that the conformity that Sherif (1935) obtained was conversion rather than mere compliance.

A significant weakness of Model 5: anticonformity \leftarrow independence \rightarrow conformity is that it represents anticonformity and conformity only as opposites. While it is true that anticonformity and conformity are indeed opposites at the operational level; that is, with respect to the influencee's postinfluence *direction* of movement; at the conceptual level, the responses are similar in that both indicate behavior that has been influenced by the source. Stated differently, both anticonformity and conformity, conceptually, are forms of *dependent* behavior. As a unidimensional model, however, Model 5 has no way of representing spatially these simultaneous opposite, yet similar, characteristics of anticonformity and conformity.

Model 7: The Crutchfield (1962) Equilateral Triangle Model

Crutchfield (1962) was the first to make the needed break with the unidimensional approach in proposing his equilateral triangle model (see also Krech et al., 1962). He did so by conceptualizing conformity, independence, and counterformity (i.e., anticonformity) as lying at the vertices of an equilateral triangle (Figure 3). Crutchfield was apparently at least partially motivated by the limitation mentioned above regarding Model 5: anticonformity \leftarrow independence \rightarrow conformity (Figure 2)—that anticonformity and conformity are opposites with respect to the direction of movement, but conceptually similar as forms of dependent behavior. "One might argue that the cognitions and actions of the counterformist are just as surely and predictably *determined* by the group as are those of the conformist" (Krech et al., 1962, p. 507, italics added).

Model 7, Crutchfield (1962)




Figure 3. Crutchfield's (1962; Krech et al., 1962) equilateral triangle model (From "Toward an Integration of Some Models and Theories of Social Response" by P. R. Nail, 1986, *Psychological Bulletin*, 100, p. 198. Copyright, 1986 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted by permission.)

In proposing the equilateral model, Crutchfield and colleagues potentially solved the inherent limitation with Model 5. The triangle being a two-dimensional figure, conformity and anticonformity might rest as opposites at the *endpoints* of one dimension while at the same time corresponding to the *same point* on the other dimension (viz., maximum *dependence* on an *independence-dependence* continuum). The Krech et al. (1962) quote above appears to propose an independence-dependence variable as one of the triangle's underlying conceptual dimensions. A weakness of their analysis, however, is that the other needed dimension was never clearly identified. Related weaknesses are that Crutchfield and colleagues never spelled out how research participants might be precisely located within the triangular response space as influence evolves over trials, or why the response space is necessarily an equilateral triangle in its shape. Willis (1963, 1965a) was able to accomplish these tasks, however, in the development of his isosceles triangle and diamond models.


Model 8: The Willis (1963) Isosceles Triangle Model

Working independently of Crutchfield and colleagues (1962; Krech et al., 1962), Willis (1963) proposed the isosceles triangle model (Figure 4). Willis explicitly identified a *dependence-independence* conceptual dimension, the same as implied by Krech et al. (1962), but also added a *net conformity* dimension. Willis placed conformity and anticonformity at opposite ends of the net conformity dimension, which lies orthogonally to, and intersects the dependence-independence dimension at, the position of maximal dependence. Thus, the isosceles model clearly indicates that although conformity and anticonformity can be conceptualized as opposites in one way (viz., the direction of movement with respect to the influence source), they are similar in that in both the direction of movement is dependent upon the source's position. As such, both stand in contrast to independence where the target is not influenced one way or the other by the source. Given that the


Model 2 Allport (1934)



Model 3 Sherif (1935)



Model 4 Asch (1951)



Model 5 Argyle (1957)



Model 6 Worchel & Brehm (1970)




Figure 2. Five unidimensional models. (Adapted from "An Analysis and Restructuring of the Diamond Model of Social Response" by P. R. Nail and M. D. Van Leeuwen, 1993, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 19, p. 109. Copyright, 1993 by Sage Periodical Press. Adapted by permission.)

Model 8, Willis (1963)




Figure 4. Willis's (1963) isosceles triangle model. (From "Two Dimensions of Conformity-Nonconformity" by R. H. Willis, 1963, *Sociometry*, 26, p. 501. Copyright, 1963 by American Sociological Association. Adapted by permission.)

isosceles model is merely a special but logically incomplete case of Willis's (1965a) diamond model (see Nail, 1986), we focus on the latter. The isosceles model can be seen, in fact, in the right hand half of the diamond model (Figure 5).

Models 9 and 10: The Willis (1965a) and Willis and Levine (1976) Diamond Models

The diamond model includes the three basic responses of the isosceles model, conformity, independence, and anticonformity, but adds a new, fourth possibility, *variability*. As theoretical abstractions, they represent *pure* forms of social response in situations where social influence is measured over multiple observations (i.e., multiple social influence trials). As pure forms of response, the four are completely undiluted by other response tendencies across trials. Such pure forms of behavior are no doubt rare, both in the laboratory and in the real world, but as boundary conditions, they are of considerable theoretical significance. The diamond model is similar to the isosceles model in that it is composed of two orthogonal conceptual dimensions, *net dependence* and *net conformity*. In the diamond model, however, Willis (1965a) extended the isosceles model's independence-dependence dimension to take the form, independence—dependence—dependence, thus offering a second type of independence (viz., variability). The responses, independence and variability, correspond to the extremes of the net dependence dimension and are therefore both forms of independent behavior. Conformity and anticonformity correspond to the extremes of the net conformity dimension. How it is that the responses independence and vari-

ability both correspond to conceptual independence on the horizontal axis is clarified below.

One strong feature of Willis's (1963, 1965a) isosceles and diamond models is that, like Crutchfield's (1962) equilateral model, both models provide for three widely recognized types of response: conformity, independence, and anticonformity. Another is that in explicitly identifying two conceptual dimensions, Willis (1965a) solved the theoretical problem only partially addressed by Crutchfield and colleagues of how to represent, in one conceptualization, the similar yet opposite natures of conformity and anticonformity.

The isosceles and diamond models are not without weaknesses, however. One major shortcoming is that neither model provides for the critical public-private distinction. Accordingly, they have no way of (a) distinguishing between conversion and compliance as special types of conformity, (b) distinguishing between anticonversion and anticompliance as special types of anticonformity, or (c) providing for strategic self-anticonformity. The reader will recall in our opening case study, that Mr. Benson was only able to get the behavior he desired from Shawn by publicly stating the opposite of his true, private desire. Thus, any model that provides for strategic self-anticonformity must include public versus private responding.

A second potential major shortcoming of the diamond model relates to its one unique response, *variability*. According to Willis (1965a), variability occurs when the target always "changes his [or her] response if given an opportunity" (p. 379). The structure of the model suggests that variability is logically necessary given the dimensions necessary to separate conformity, independence, and anticonformity, but is this true? Furthermore, based on Willis's description, it is difficult "to imagine why such behavior would ever occur" (Shaw & Costanzo, 1970, p. 325). Is there any empirical evidence supporting the existence of variability?

Is a fourth response in the diamond model logically necessary? There are a number of ways of demonstrating the logical necessity of variability (see Nail, 1986). One is to consider how Willis (1965a) augmented the interpretation of the diamond

Model 9, Willis (1965a)




Figure 5. Willis's (1965a) diamond model (From "Conformity, Independence, and Anticonformity" by R. H. Willis, 1965, *Human Relations*, 18, p. 380. Copyright, 1965 by Plenum Publishing Company. Adapted by permission.)

model's two dimensions, which, in turn, led eventually to a change in the interpretation of variability, as well as a change in its label. According to Willis (1965a), the diamond model's vertical dimension, net conformity, can also be regarded as a *group* (or external influence source) dimension, while the horizontal dimension, net dependence, can be regarded as a *self* (or internal influence source) dimension. Under this interpretation, the diamond model's response, independence, can be correctly interpreted as *self-conformity* in that in the pure form the influence target always winds up agreeing with her or his initial position independently of any social pressures. Given this interpretation, it appears that the logical opposite of self-conformity would be *self-anticonformity*, where in the pure form the target always ends up going against her or his initial position, but once again, independently of pressure from others. Thus, altogether, the diamond model provides for two types of conformity and two types of anticonformity: (a) conformity and anticonformity to the group and (b) conformity anticonformity to the self (viz., independence and self-anticonformity, respectively). Accordingly, Willis and Levine (1976) formally replaced the label *variability* for the diamond model's fourth pure response possibility in favor of *self-anticonformity* (Model 10; Figure 6).

Does self-anticonformity actually occur? Aided by Willis and Levine's (1976) change of labeling from variability to self-anticonformity, Nail and colleagues have identified numerous situations where self-anticonformity can and does occur (Nail, 1986; Nail & Ruch, 1992; Nail & Thompson, 1990; Nail & Van Leeuwen, 1993). As in our opening example with Shawn's physics teacher, one is when an influencer is attempting to persuade an

oppositional or recalcitrant influencee to change her or his behavior. Another is one of several forms that the self-serving bias (Larson, 1977) can take; this form occurs when one seems to put oneself down in front of others as a tactic to elicit encouragement and social reinforcement from these same people (MacDonald et al., 2011; Powers & Zuroff, 1988). A very different situation where self-anticonformity can occur is on true-false tests.

Consider a student who is taking a true-false test in chemistry and perceives that she or he is weak in this subject. With self-anticonformity, the student reads a statement and thinks something like, "Let's see; I think this one is false. . . . But wait, I'm not any good in chemistry. If I think it's false, it's probably true. I'll go with true." Note that this internal dialogue reflects self-anticonformity in that the self is used as a *negative referent* (Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995; Wood et al., 1996), and the person changes her or his initial response accordingly. This example is consistent with Hollander and Willis's (1967) suggestion that self-anticonformity might be the result in situations where a person has very low self-esteem. Note also that the change in one's response in such cases is *independent* of outside influences. Thus, self-anticonformity, like independence, represents a form of independent behavior.

Hayhurst, Higgins, and Nail (1988, April) wondered how prevalent self-anticonformity might be on their campus. They interviewed a random sample of students and found that 60% reported having had thoughts reflecting self-anticonformity while taking true-false tests in actual classes. What is more, 50% reported that they had, on occasion, actually reversed their initial inclinations on true-false tests based on thoughts reflecting self-anticonformity! In

Model 10, Willis and Levine (1976)




Figure 6. Willis and J. M. Levine's (1976) diamond model presented in terms of operational definitions. The data are from Nail and Ruch (1992, Experiment 1, "Social Influence and the Diamond Model of Social Response: Toward an Extended Theory of Informational Influence" by P. R. Nail and G. L. Ruch, 1992, *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 31, p. 175. Copyright, 1993 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd., for the British Psychological Association. Adapted by permission.) Note: The proximal zero to pure Anticonformity indicates zero postinfluence agreement between the target and source. In contrast, the proximal zero to pure Independence indicates zero pre- to postinfluence absolute movement by the target.

laboratory work, Nail and colleagues (Nail & Ruch, 1992; Nail & Thompson, 1990) found that participants spontaneously and quickly adopted a strategy reflecting self-anticonformity on true–false questions once learning that their intuitions were consistently wrong. Such questions are known colloquially as *trick questions*.

Nail and Ruch (1992, Experiment 1) randomly assigned participants to one of four experimental conditions paralleling the four pure responses of the Willis and Levine (1976) diamond model (Figure 6). A computer presented each participant and an alleged partner with a series of 20 true–false trivia questions; the “partner,” in all conditions was actually a confederate of the experimenter. As the session progressed, the computer appeared to provide authoritative feedback with respect to each question. In the conformity condition, things were arranged so that the partner’s response to each question was always declared correct by the computer, whereas in the independence condition, it was the genuine participant’s response that was always declared correct. In the anticonformity condition, the partner’s response was always declared incorrect, whereas in the self-anticonformity condition, it was the genuine participant’s response that was always declared incorrect. After going through the 20 questions once, participants were allowed to respond to each question a second time, and it was this second response that “counted.” With the partner defined as the source of reference, would participants learn to conform, remain independent, anticonform, or self-anticonform, over trials, consistent with the respective input and feedback they had received from their partner and the computer?

For statistical analysis and plotting of the data points, the 20 questions were broken down into five blocks of four questions each. Consistent with Willis’s (1965a) diamond model protocol and scoring formulas, Nail and Ruch (1992) plotted participants’ (a) absolute pre- to postinfluence movement scores in terms of proportions on the diamond model’s horizontal axis (reminiscent of Model 4, Asch’s [1951], independence → conformity model, Figure 2) and (b) final net agreement scores with the partner in terms of proportions on the diamond model’s vertical axis (reminiscent of Model 2, Allport’s [1934], non-conformity — conformity model; Figure 2). As can be seen in Figure 6, the results were clear. Participants in the conformity, anticonformity, and self-anticonformity conditions all showed clear and significant movement toward their respective apices over the five blocks of trials. Independence participants, in contrast, were almost completely impervious to influence from their partner. Being told that they were always right by the computer, independence participants showed almost no movement over the five blocks of trials.

Model 11: The Nail and Van Leeuwen (1993) Restructured Diamond Model

From the Nail and Ruch (1992) findings (Figure 6), as well as Willis’s own research (e.g., Willis, 1963, 1965b; Willis & Hollander, 1964), it is clear that at the operational level the diamond model is quite literally nothing more than an x - and y -coordinate system, or Cartesian plane, as routinely used in math classes. A couple of aspects of the plane in Figure 6, however, do not look quite right. First, by convention, the axes in a Cartesian plane intersect at the (0, 0) coordinate point; yet, in Figure 6 they intersect at (0.5, 0.5). Second, the horizontal and vertical axes of a

Cartesian plane are, by convention, quantified left to right and bottom to top, respectively; yet, in Figure 6 the horizontal axis is quantified backwards, so to speak, from right to left. Fortunately, once the mental set of the Willis (1965a) and Willis and Levine (1976) framing of the diamond model is broken, these problems are easily overcome. Model 11, Nail and Van Leeuwen’s (1993) restructured version of the operational diamond model that follows convention, is presented in Figure 7. The restructured model is fundamentally the same as the original except now the axes intersect at the (0, 0) point and the horizontal axis has been inverted. Accordingly, independence now falls at the left apex, self-anticonformity at the right.³

Regardless of whether one is referring to the original or restructured version of the diamond model, however, at base the model is simply a type of map within which all responses must fall, assuming that there is an equal number of trials on which there is initial agreement between the target and influence source and an equal number of trials on which there is initial disagreement. The diamond models further assume that the potential for positive or negative movement is equal across trials (as on true–false tests).

Model 12: The Double Diamond—A Unified Continuous-Response Model

From the above review of social response models, it appears that to be inclusive a model must include and consider numerous criteria/dimensions. At the operational level, these include (a) the degree of initial or preinfluence agreement-disagreement between the target and source of influence, (b) the degree of pre- to postinfluence movement by the target, and (c) the degree of postinfluence agreement-disagreement between the target and source. At the conceptual level, the dimensions include the degrees of (d) net dependence, (e) net conformity, and (f) public-private. Once it is understood that the diamond model is really nothing more than a Cartesian plane (Figures 6 and 7), and given that between the operational and conceptual levels, the diamond model includes all of the dimensions listed above with the exception of (f) public-private, it appears that a unified continuous-response model of social influence can be neatly accomplished by simply extending the conceptual, restructured diamond model into a third, public-private dimension (Model 12; Figure 8). We refer to this model as the *double diamond model*.

Everything about the double diamond model is the same as the restructured diamond model. The double diamond simply acknowledges and allows one to represent in three-dimensional space that the four basic responses can occur simultaneously at either of two levels, the public and the private. Regardless of the public response: conformity, independence, anticonformity, or

³ In this context, it is interesting to note that Willis is left-handed and that he characteristically draws horizontal lines from right to left. Consistent with this characteristic, in Willis (1965, September, Figure 1) he depicted the movement of Asch’s (1951) independence → conformity model (Figure 2, herein) as conformity ← independence. When we pointed these departures from conventionality out to Willis, he good-naturedly shrugged them off and quoted Nobel Laureate, Herb Simon, as once having said regarding his own capacity for divergent thinking and creativity, “Well, when you’re a left-handed, color-blind, Jew, you tend to see the world a little differently.”

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

self-anticonformity, a participant might display any degree or mixture of these same responses at the private level.

Allow C, I, A, and S to represent conformity, independence, anticonformity, and self-anticonformity, respectively, at the public level, and c, i, a, and s to represent these same responses, respectively, at the private level (Figure 8). If one considers only the pure forms of response at both the public and private levels, the double diamond provides for 4² or 16 response possibilities: Cc, Ci, Ca, Cs, Ic, Ii, Ia, Is, Ac, Ai, Aa, As, Sc, Si, Sa, and Ss. These 16 include all of the responses discussed above (and more) but now in an explicitly three-dimensional, continuous-response format. To be specific, the responses conversion, compliance, independence, anticonversion, anticompliance, and paradoxical anticompliance are captured in the double diamond model by Cc, Ci, Ii, Aa, Ai, and Ic, respectively. Note that Cc indicates conversion conformity in that there is pure conformity at both the public (C) and private (c) levels. Ci, however, indicates compliance conformity because here there is pure conformity at the public level (C), but pure independence at the private level (i). Ii indicates pure independence. The double diamond model simply makes explicit what was only implied in the original diamond model's independence—that despite social pressure, the influence target holds her or his ground and has not changed either publicly or privately (Allen, 1965).⁴

The theoretically significant distinction discussed above between anticonversion and anticompliance as special types of anticonformity (MacDonald et al., 2004; Nail et al., 2000) is captured in the double diamond's Aa and Ai, respectively. Anticonversion (Aa) can occur when one is internally motivated to distance one's

Model 12




Figure 8. A double diamond model of social response. (C = conformity, I = Independence, A = Anticonformity, and S = Self-anticonformity. Capital letters indicate public responses, small case letters private responses.)

Model 11, Nail and Van Leeuwen (1993)




Figure 7. The Nail and Van Leeuwen (1993) restructured diamond model. (C = conformity, I = Independence, A = Anticonformity, and S = Self-anticonformity. From "An Analysis and Restructuring of the Diamond Model of Social Response" by P. R. Nail and M. D. Van Leeuwen, 1993, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 19, p. 107. Copyright, 1993 by Sage Periodical Press. Adapted by permission.)

self from extremely dissimilar or disliked individuals or groups ("From Swastika to Thunderbird," 2012; Hogg & Abrams, 1987; MacDonald et al., 2004, p. 83; Nail et al., 2000, p. 457). Anticompliance (Ai), in contrast, occurs when one only wishes to project autonomy or disagreement (e.g., Baer et al., 1980; Cooper & Jones, 1968; Nail et al., 1996; Pool, Wood, & Leck, 1998).

Ic indicates paradoxical anticompliance—the atypical type of anticonformity that was first suggested by Allen (1965) but first formally identified by Nail and colleagues (MacDonald et al., 2004; Nail et al., 2000). Here, targets of influence are moved at the private level by the content of a source's communication but are somehow motivated, in the face of social pressure, to not reveal publicly that they have been so influenced (e.g., Abrams et al., 1990, Study 2; Eagly et al., 1981; Griskevicius et al., 2006; Moscovici et al., 1969; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974).

Willis and Levine's (1976) self-anticonformity is captured in the double diamond model. The double diamond simply makes it explicit that self-anticonformity can occur both publicly and privately or at either level by itself. The public-private distinction regarding self-anticonformity is especially significant because

⁴ It should be noted that the double diamond is not intended as a measurement model in which different types of social response are represented with a single point in three-dimensional space. Rather, in the vein of previous social response models, the double diamond provides a heuristic framework for distinguishing and classifying different types of social response using separate points on two Cartesian planes, one for influencees' public responding, and one for influencees' private responding.

strategic self-anticonformity as used by the influencer (Mr. Benson) in the case of Shawn entails self-anticonformity only at the public level. Finally, compromise as a response possibility (Asch, 1956; Chuang et al., 2012) is not one of the pure response possibilities of the double diamond model. Nevertheless, it can be represented in the double diamond by a point somewhere near half way between I and C on the public diamond but very close to i on the private diamond (Figure 8). In other words, at the level of public responding, the compromiser moves toward the influencer, toward conformity, but not to a position of complete agreement; at the private level, however, the compromiser remains essentially independent and unmoved.

Having proposed the double diamond model as a unified, continuous-response model, a number of important questions suggest themselves. Can the model lead to new directions in theory and research? Can the model help in our understanding of influence processes? Stated differently, the model does a good job of bringing together for the first time in a continuous-response model certain distinctions that are or should be recognized as theoretically significant (e.g., anticonversion, anticompliance, and paradoxical anticompliance as three distinct varieties of anticonformity). Yet, what about some of the novel combinations suggested by the model, combinations such as public self-anticonformity/private independence (Si)? Do such combinations occur in the real world? If so, in what circumstances are they likely to occur? Might they be useful in applied settings?

Strategic Self-Anticonformity

There is, in fact, a perfect fit between public self-anticonformity/private independence (Si) and our opening example of *strategic self-anticonformity*. In the case of Shawn, the reader will recall that Mr. Benson's initial attempts to directly motivate Shawn had failed and that Mr. Benson eventually tried a more indirect strategy to inspire Shawn, namely, by telling him that he did not have the ability to perform as well as his older sister. So, Mr. Benson publicly self-anticonformed to his true private position as an influence strategy. Yet, Mr. Benson's true, private position—believing in Shawn and wanting to help actualize his potential—never wavered. In this sense, Mr. Benson remained independent at the level of his private attitude. Publicly going against, or anticonforming to, one's true position (S) as part of an influence strategy, all the while privately remaining true to one's self and initial position (i), fit the defining criteria for strategic self-anticonformity (Si).

MacDonald et al. (2011, Study 2) examined how prevalent strategic self-anticonformity is compared to more established influence techniques, namely, foot-in-the-door (Freedman & Fraser, 1966), door-in-the-face (Cialdini et al., 1975), and disrupt-then-reframe (Davis & Knowles, 1999). MacDonald et al. described each of the techniques to a sample of 69 undergraduates and asked if they could provide examples of when they had used such influence tactics. The students were able to provide more examples judged valid for the foot-in-the-door ($N = 38$) and the door-in-the-face ($N = 47$) techniques than for strategic self-anticonformity ($N = 26$). At the same time, 26 represents 38% of the sample, and the students were only able to supply 29 valid examples of the disrupt-then-reframe technique. The median estimate students pro-

vided of the frequency with which they used strategic self-anticonformity as an influence tactic was once every 1.5 months.

The influencer in Shawn's case, Mr. Benson, changed his influence strategy to the indirect approach of strategic self-anticonformity only after his direct approach in requesting that Shawn work a little harder had failed. A slightly different manifestation of strategic self-anticonformity appears to occur when an influencer is interacting with an influencee who has a long and established track record of actively opposing influence from others—of being habitually negativistic and compulsive, even hostile, in her or his dissent. Whereas the term *anticonformity* refers to a type of response, the term *anticonformist* refers to a type of person—the habitual and compulsive dissenter (Krech et al., 1962; Nail, 2009). When interacting with a genuine anticonformist (see Sulloway, 1996), an individual seeking to exert influence should probably dispense with the direct approach of first suggesting a course of action that she or he most prefers in favor of strategic self-anticonformity from the outset. Using strategic self-anticonformity initially may also have the advantage of concealing the fact that the influencer is even using an influence tactic.

We hasten to point out that we are not endorsing or generally recommending such an influence strategy. After all, it necessarily involves deception. Nevertheless, in the interest of elucidating the psychological processes that mediate people's responses to social pressure, it is important to consider the individual differences that render potential influencees most susceptible to strategic self-anticonformity.

One set of individual difference variables that may be particularly relevant to strategic self-anticonformity concerns the distinction between reactive and reflective autonomy (Koestner & Losier, 1996). *Reactive autonomy* is based Henry Murray's (1938) conceptualization of autonomy as a chronic motivation to avoid influence from others and is typically assessed with the Adjective Checklist (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983). In Murray's (1938) view, people high in the need for autonomy "want to go their own way, uninfluenced and uncoerced by others" (p. 152). In this regard, reactive autonomy is akin to the concept of psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966; Koestner & Losier, 1996). *Reflective autonomy* is based on Deci and Ryan's (1985) conceptualization of autonomy as a capacity for self-endorsed action based on a reflective consideration of one's interests, needs, and values. In this regard, reflective autonomy is akin to the concept of the "true self," which is discussed in more detail later. Reflective autonomy is typically assessed with the General Causality Orientations Scale (Deci & Ryan, 1985).

Koestner et al. (1999) examined whether reactive and reflective autonomy moderated people's reactions to expert influence. Participants were given the opportunity to win money at a racetrack betting game and, in the course of the experimental task, were given objective information about horses' previous performances. It is important to note that participants were also given useful betting recommendations by credible experts. Participants thus had the option of exclusively relying on their own judgment or also following the given expert advice. The results of this study revealed that whereas reflective autonomy was associated with following expert recommendations, reactive autonomy was associated with the rejection of expert advice even among those participants who had received losing feedback on their previous betting attempt. These findings suggest that reactively autonomous

individuals are disposed toward anticonformity and that when interacting with a reactively autonomous person, an individual seeking to exert influence should probably dispense with the direct approach of first suggesting a course of action that she or he most prefers or recommends in favor of strategic self-anticonformity from the outset.

Although there are clearly ethical questions around the use of strategic self-anticonformity, our points are that (a) the tactic does exist and (b) it can be effective (MacDonald et al., 2011). At a broader theoretical level, the significance of strategic self-anticonformity lies in its relationship to the other, more established responses of the double diamond model. These relationships are all clearly mapped out in the structure of the double diamond model (Figure 8).

Strategic Self-Anticonformity and Clinical Intervention

As was previously highlighted in the case of Shawn, Mr. Benson's strategic self-anticonformity may be conceptualized as both an influence response and an influence tactic to deal with Shawn's initial noncompliance. This highlights that in order for strategic self-anticonformity to occur, there must be some reciprocal relationship between the influencer and influencee. In this light, the metacognitive dynamics of strategic self-anticonformity indicate a key relation to a number of important self-regulation techniques for purposive and even therapeutic change.

Paradoxical intention. In many ways, a psychotherapy session can be correctly conceptualized as a social influence setting, with the therapist and client as mutual influencers and influencees (see Erickson, 1964; Frankl, 1967; Knowles, Butler, & Linn, 2001). Even though clients come to therapy seeking change, they are at the same time frequently resistant to it. *Paradoxical intention*, however, can be a means of overcoming this resistance. With the technique, the therapist commands the client to engage in behavior that is actually the opposite of the desired outcome. In double diamond terms, the therapist publicly self-anticonforms to her or his goal of helping alleviate the client's symptoms while privately holding to this goal (i.e., independence). When the client resists the therapist's command (anticonforms), the client frequently ends up with the very outcome that is actually desired by the therapist and client alike.

Consider as an example using paradoxical intention with cases of phobia and panic attacks. After a basic level of trust between therapist and client has been established, the therapist instructs the client (a) to confront the phobic target (e.g., a fear of heights) and (b) that he or she *must* have a panic attack in the process. The therapist might say something like, "Come on, you can do better than that. You're not really focusing. I insist that you have a panic attack. You must let loose. I command that you have a panic attack all over the place." Ironically, when such clients do try to have an attack under such instructions, they are frequently unable to do so (Frankl, 1967; see also Loredio & Vella, 1992). With continued support and encouragement in employing paradoxical intention in cases of phobia, Frankl (1967) reported success rates as high as 75%. The technique is theoretically important because in a backward sort of way it teaches the client that he or she does, in fact, have control over the focal behavior, that which was previously believed by the client to be beyond control.

Strategic self-anticonformity appears to require a conscious awareness and evaluation of one's private position along with an effortful attempt to outwardly enact the very opposite response. It is thus especially interesting to consider strategic self-anticonformity solely within the individual, that is, when influencer and influencee are one and the same. One such technique is commonplace in cognitive-behavioral therapies (Beck, 1995; Greenberger & Padesky, 1995). The underlying assumption of cognitive-behavioral therapies is that psychological distress that is common to many forms of psychopathology arises as a consequence of the manner in which people interpret and emotionally respond to particular events in their day-to-day lives. Accordingly, one goal of such therapies is to help people modify their negative and maladaptive responses to more adaptive and realistic ways of thinking. While this is initially done with the guidance and collaboration of a therapist, an essential component of this treatment involves clients completing homework assignments through which they learn to become more aware of their own thinking dynamics and how to actively challenge their unhealthy patterns of thought and behavior on their own.

Homework assignments in cognitive-behavioral therapy often take the form of "thought records" (Greenberger & Padesky, 1995), which are guided emotional regulation exercises for managing distressing events. In using such thought records, clients are typically instructed (a) to describe the objective features of the distressing event, (b) to detail their subjective interpretation of the event at the onset of their emotional distress, and (c) to document any evidence that they feel supports their own interpretation of the event. Crucially, clients are subsequently instructed (d) to consider evidence that does not support their subjective interpretations, and finally, (e) to consider alternative interpretations of the distressing event, no matter how unlikely. Over time, repeatedly filling out thought records helps clients develop greater self-awareness and helps them to identify and modify their negative and unhealthy patterns of thinking. What is crucial for the present discussion, however, is that this therapeutic technique actually constitutes a very systematic form of strategic self-anticonformity as steps (d) and (e) require that clients anticonform to their true position.

Motivational interviewing. Capitalizing on the double diamond model's continuous response format allows us to recover another strategic, albeit less self-anticonforming, influence tactic that holds considerable applied significance. *Motivational interviewing* (Miller & Rollnick, 1991, 2002) is a widely utilized approach to counseling and psychotherapy that has been defined as a "client-centered, directive method for enhancing intrinsic motivation to change by exploring and resolving ambivalence" (Miller & Rollnick, 2002, p. 25). Motivational interviewing was originally developed for the treatment of problem drinking, but has since been elaborated and adapted to treat a wide variety of problem behaviors (e.g., drug abuse, smoking) in a variety of clinical settings. Motivational interviewing is based on the assumption that clients enter counseling with ambivalent and even conflicting motivations. This presents a particular challenge for the counselor—directly attempting to persuade a client to change will prove ineffective because such an approach implies endorsing one side of the client's internal conflict, and this may in turn provoke the client to anticonform to the counselor's directives. Thus, counselors using motivational interviewing encourage their clients to openly voice ambivalence in order to help them intensify their own

awareness of how their problematic behaviors are incongruent with their abiding goals and values.

Miller and Rollnick (1991, 2002) emphasize that counselors must refrain from trying to oppose the client's expressed desire to not change their own problem behaviors—a strategy called “rolling with resistance”—because such a direct influence attempt will likely backfire by increasing the client's resistance. Cast in terms of the double diamond, rolling with resistance appears to reside somewhere between independence and self-anticonformity on the public diamond and very close to independence on the private diamond. This is because the counselor maintains her or his overarching goal of helping to facilitate behavioral change in the client all the while publicly self-anticonforming to an intermediate degree by not openly disagreeing with the client when the client expresses the desire to not change. Identifying rolling with resistance on the double diamond thus not only demonstrates the combined descriptive power of the double diamond's public-private distinction, it also highlights the utility of its continuous-response format.

Where Is the “True Self” on the Double Diamond?

The idea of the “true self” has a rich history within the psychodynamic, existential, and humanistic psychological traditions (e.g., Horney, 1951; May, 1981; Rogers, 1951). It continues to be an important topic in contemporary research on motivation and personality development (e.g., Harter, 2002; Kernis & Goldman, 2005; Schlegel & Hicks, 2011; Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008). Although the topic of “true self” has been approached in a number of ways, an important commonality among the various perspectives is the emphasis on the nature of people's subjective experiences. The principal concern for researchers who investigate the “true self” is the extent to which people feel like the authors of their own actions and the degree to which people are able to personally endorse such behaviors upon reflection (Ryan & Deci, 2006).

Despite its longevity and widespread significance, the topic of the true self has yet to become a major theme in the social response literature. Indeed, as our review makes apparent, no extant model of social response has formally addressed the extent to which influence outcomes are differentially associated with the experience of being true to one's self. The only exceptions are models that include independence as a response outcome (e.g., Models 1, 4, and 8 herein; Allen, 1965; Asch, 1951; Willis, 1963, respectively). Even in these cases, however, the ties between independence and the true self have never been systematically developed. While some influence outcomes may never be fully “owned” or experienced as “authentic,” other influence messages may actually be incorporated into and subsequently enacted from people's abiding sense of self. This is important because social responses may differ both in terms of duration and cross-situational generality as a function of the extent to which they are subjectively experienced as genuine expressions of people's self (cf., conversion vs. compliance; anticonversion vs. anticompliance). Moreover, the experience of being true to one's self has been empirically associated with improved psychological functioning. This implies that social responses may also bear important implications for psychological health to the extent that they are in line with the true self.

By extending the previous diamond models of Willis (1965a), Willis and Levine (1976), and Nail and Van Leeuwen (1993) to incorporate the public-private distinction, the double diamond renders the question of the true self especially salient as it challenges us to reflect upon the nature of the subjective experiences associated with the possible response incongruities across the public and private levels. How do people subjectively experience discrepancies between their public and private responses to social influence? Moreover, as was previously exemplified in the cases of compromise, the double diamond's continuous-response format draws attention to “impure” or “blended” types of social influence outcomes. To what extent are people able to reflectively endorse such complex responses?

We find the conceptual and operational framework of self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2008) to be especially useful in contextualizing the above questions. According to SDT, people are naturally motivated to internalize sociocultural practices and norms into their extant set of abiding personal goals and values. SDT researchers thus construe development as an ongoing social influence setting, with individuals and the social contexts they inhabit as mutual influencers and influencees. SDT researchers conceptualize the experience of being true to one's self as a matter of degree and accordingly define different qualities of internalization (or social response) along a continuum of *self-determination*. As a motivational state, self-determination refers to the extent to which people experience their own actions as being choicefully initiated and volitionally enacted. Moreover, self-determined behaviors are personally endorsed because they are guided by a reflective awareness of people's abiding needs and values. The degree to which a behavioral regulation is enacted with a sense of self-determination bespeaks the extent to which the influence message has been internalized into one's abiding sense of self (Deci & Ryan, 1985). It is important to note that a vast body of research conducted over a variety of applied contexts (e.g., workplace environments, educational contexts, clinical settings) underscores the importance of self-determination in the development of optimal forms of motivation, greater persistence and performance, and higher levels of well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2008).

Research in SDT has empirically distinguished four types of behavioral regulation that represent different levels of internalization (Deci & Ryan, 2008; Ryan & Connell, 1989). These different qualities of behavioral regulation with varying degrees of self-determination appear to correspond with several types of social response represented on the double diamond. As a point of entry for specifically examining the true self in relation to social influence, these correspondences also help to cross-validate newly identified forms of social response that are captured by the double diamond model.

External regulation connotes an absence of internalization and is the least self-determined response to social pressure. External regulation is evidenced when an individual conforms to an influence message strictly for the purpose of attaining some instrumentally separable reward or avoiding some punishment. Continuing with our previous example, suppose that Mr. Benson attempts to motivate Shawn by telling him that he will be forced to attend supervised afterschool homework sessions if he does not improve his grades on the next test. Under the threat of losing free time with his friends, Shawn publicly conforms (C) to Mr. Benson's admo-

nitions to study—at least temporarily—but nonetheless continues to dislike physics and only puts forth a halfhearted effort (i). Although Shawn may superficially yield to Mr. Benson, he is still not personally invested in studying for Mr. Benson’s physics class.

In this above example, compliance on the double diamond (Ci) neatly corresponds with SDT’s formulation of an externally regulated, “false self” behavior (Figure 8). In other contexts, however, external regulation may correspond to other types of social response articulated with the double diamond. For example, let us imagine that Mr. Benson becomes a little less concerned and severe with Shawn whenever he hears him make comments to other students that may be interpreted to suggest that Shawn has an underlying interest in physics after all. The astute and cunning Shawn decides to strategically self-anticonform, being sure that Mr. Benson is within earshot whenever he finds creative ways to publicly yet subtly insinuate his supposed interest in physics. Because Shawn’s behavior is motivated by the strict purpose of placating Mr. Benson, this example illustrates that strategic self-anticonformity may, at times, represent an insincere form of compliance and what SDT researchers would accordingly identify as an externally regulated behavior.

Anticompliance (Ai) may constitute another example of an externally regulated, false self behavior on the double diamond (Figure 8), particularly when enacted by an individual high in reactive autonomy (Koestner, & Loiser, 1996). Koestner et al. (1999) proposed that individuals high in reactive autonomy may be disposed to interpreting social requests as threats to their capacity for self-determination. Ironically, when undergoing social influence, such individuals impulsively and unreflectively resist social influence and even become oppositional. Against the backdrop of this defensiveness, it is unlikely that such instances of anticompliance represent the actions of the true self.

While external regulation characterizes the absence of internalization, *introjected regulation* refers to influence messages that have been adopted by the influencee but not experienced as being subjectively “owned” or part of their “core” self. Indeed, introjected regulation is the least internalized response to social influence, and the accompanying behaviors are enacted with a low level of self-determination. Introjected regulation is evidenced when one is motivated to perform an activity to avoid feelings of shame and guilt or to defensively maintain feelings of self-worth. In this sense, introjected regulations are akin to Higgins’ (1987) conception of the *ought self*. Although introjected regulations are prompted by motivational forces within the person, the impetus for such behaviors is nonetheless coercive and phenomenologically outside of one’s sense of self. Rather than being wholehearted and volitional, the enactment of such behaviors is experienced as being conflicted and internally pressured.

In its classic form, introjected regulation highlights the possibility for an influencee to outwardly conform to an influence message even though the influence message itself can only be privately endorsed to an intermediate degree, never becoming an integral part of the influencee’s sense of self. Introjected regulation may thus be represented on the double diamond by a point very close to conformity on the public diamond and by a point halfway between (i) and I on the private diamond (Figure 8). According to SDT, introjected regulations develop when important socializing agents (e.g., parents, teachers, etc.) attempt to induce conformity by making their affection and approval contingent upon the per-

formance of some desired behavior. In an attempt to preserve a sense of social relatedness, people will often conform to and even adopt such social directives as standards for evaluating their own self-worth (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1995). It is important to highlight that introjected regulation represents a suboptimal form of motivation because it entails unhealthy, defensive forms of self-esteem and because it is associated with a poor quality of performance in the long-term (Deci & Ryan, 2008).

In this light, it is interesting to reconsider the case of Shawn as it was originally described. Although Mr. Benson was able to motivate Shawn in the short-term by shaming him, all but explicitly telling Shawn that he is not as worthy as his older sister, Shawn’s emotional reaction to Mr. Benson’s comments suggest that the motivational dynamics underlying his eventual conformity to Mr. Benson are that of introjected regulation. That is, rather than being moved by personal interest or by an increased appreciation for the importance of doing one’s best in school, Shawn appears to be preoccupied with the defensive and costly pursuit of self-esteem (Deci & Ryan, 1995). In this line, it is interesting to note that MacDonald et al. (2011) found that, apart from being used as a general persuasion tactic, strategic self-anticonformity is sometimes used as a tool to garner interpersonal reassurance. When used in this manner, individuals will publicly disparage themselves with the goal of eliciting reassurance from intimate others. As one participant in the MacDonald et al. study reported, “I use this tactic after tests. I’ll say “I failed” so others will respond by saying something encouraging.” In specific contexts, strategic self-anticonformity may thus be another way in which introjected regulation is manifested on the double diamond.

Identified regulation represents a more internalized response to social influence. Identified regulation is evidenced when one is motivated to perform an activity because one personally grasps its underlying importance. Because the reasons for engaging in such activities are reflectively endorsed by the person, the associated behaviors are enacted with a relatively greater degree of self-determination. One likely example of identified regulation on the double diamond is the familiar case of compromise, which is represented by a point midway between (I) and (C) on the public diamond, and by a point very close to (i) on the private diamond (Figure 8). When people compromise, they willingly partially conform to an influence message that they do not personally endorse but nonetheless maintain some congruence between their private and public independence. In this sense, their actions remain informed and guided by their true sentiments and opinions. Identified regulation may also manifest on the double diamond as newly articulated forms of social response such as public anticonformity/private conformity (Ac). Such an influence outcome would occur when the influencee is privately persuaded by the influence message but nonetheless decides to voice strong public disagreement with the influence source. As will be more thoroughly explicated later, such behaviors might be relatively common in group decision-making contexts when one individual decides to adopt the role of the “devil’s advocate” within her or his group. The individual in question may identify with the value of devil’s advocacy and willingly take on the responsibility for playing this role within her or his group.

Integrated regulation connotes the fullest extent of internalization and is the most self-determined response to social pressure. Integrated regulation occurs when one is able to harmo-

niously incorporate an influence message into the set of core goals and values that constitute one's sense of self. Integrated regulations are experienced as being "true to the self" in the strictest sense and thus imply a high degree of congruence between public and private levels of responding. Accordingly, strong candidates for integrated regulation on the double diamond (Figure 8) are represented by conversion conformity (Cc), independence (Ii), and anticonversion (Aa), and we would expect that such influence responses are characterized by a level of self-determination.

Public self-anticonformity/private self-anticonformity (Ss) represents a prospectively new and interesting type of social response and is reminiscent of the concept of *metanoia*, which Northrop Frye defined as a "... change of outlook or spiritual metamorphosis, an enlarged vision of the dimensions of human life" (Frye, 1982, p. 130). Although *metanoia* does not constitute a formal topic of investigation within SDT, many theorists have highlighted the importance of this concept for healthy development, characterizing it as the process through which individuals openly acknowledge their own presumptions and personal mistakes and voluntarily work to recast their personal goals and values (e.g., Peterson, 1999; Rogers, 1951). Thus, in its most dramatic forms, instances of public self-anticonformity/private self-anticonformity may punctuate developmentally critical occasions in which individuals renounce their extant goals and values and discover, explore, and even commit to new perspectives. Because *metanoia* entails an open, reflective awareness and choiceful consideration of different possibilities, it represents an act of the true self.

The preceding consideration of the true self in relation to the double diamond is by no means exhaustive. We hope that by highlighting points of convergence between the double diamond model and SDT, the foregoing discussion will serve to stimulate future research on the topic. Specifically, we hope that our consideration of the true self will help integrate models of social response, particularly the double diamond model, with the literature on motivation and personality development. In a related vein, given the possible implications for the true self and self-determination, the myriad of possible social responses suggested by the double diamond model may prove to be a useful as a rubric for the design of effective interventions in applied settings. More specifically, applied researchers may be able to utilize the double diamond as a framework with which to conceptualize and catalogue various types of social response.

Potential Weaknesses, Strengths, and Future Directions

Weaknesses

One apparent weakness of the double diamond model is that, inclusive as it is, it does not appear to include all important types of social response that have been previously identified. We refer to *disinhibitory contagion* (Levy, 1992; alias *behavioral contagion*, Wheeler, 1966), conceptually defined as, "a type of social influence that occurs when an individual who is in an approach-avoidance conflict experiences a reduction in restraints as a result of observing a model [or "trigger person"]; the model's behavior

reduces the observer's avoidance gradient, thus freeing the observer to engage in the desired act" (Nail et al., 2000, p. 457). As a hypothetical example, what if Shawn in our opening case study had started his physics class in an approach-avoidance conflict over the possibility of trying his best and perhaps successfully competing with his older sister, privately desiring to compete with her but lacking the confidence to follow through publicly? Here there would be preinfluence public disagreement/private agreement with Mr. Benson's initial position that Shawn should try harder. This situation is very different from the actual case where Shawn was simply unmotivated. Had Shawn been in such an approach-avoidance conflict, however, his observation of a trigger—a peer doing her or his best and successfully competing with Shawn's sister—might have given Shawn the confidence he lacked. Observing such a successful model could have freed Shawn to do his best, uncorking the latent ability that was there all along. Such influence would constitute a case of disinhibitory contagion.

Disinhibitory contagion has been sometimes confused with conformity (e.g., Milgram, 1974, pp. 113–122; Shaw, 1981, p. 432), but there is clear evidence that the two should be regarded as separate and unique phenomena. For example, Smith, Murphy, and Wheeler (1964) found that authoritarianism adjusted for IQ was positively correlated with the degree of Asch-type conformity but not with the degree of disinhibitory contagion. Baron and Kepner (1970), Goethals and Perlstein (1978), and Wheeler and Levine (1967) all found that a dissimilar model increased disinhibitory contagion, whereas dissimilarity between a group and a target of influence usually decreases conformity (e.g., Abrams et al., 1990; Hornstein, Fisch, & Holmes, 1968; Wilder, 1990).

Considering the double diamond model's integrative power at a somewhat deeper level, however, the model does in fact provide for disinhibitory contagion, as well as many more pure response possibilities, not just the 16 identified above. This is so because these 16 are all the pure forms of response that are possible if and only if two implicit assumptions are made: (a) That there is preinfluence (i.e., preexposure) agreement between a potential influencee's public and private positions and (b) that a potential influencee begins a potential social influence encounter from a position of public and private independence (Ii) with respect to the influence source. Both of these assumptions are quite reasonable in that they are met in most social influence studies and settings (but not in studies of disinhibitory contagion). However, they are not necessary assumptions of the double diamond model itself. If these assumptions are not met, then the double diamond model easily accommodates disinhibitory contagion. In double diamond terminology, the influencee's approach-avoidance conflict in disinhibitory contagion can be conceptualized as an influencee's conflict between preinfluence public independence/private conformity (Ic) with the eventual influencer—the model or trigger person. Following influence, however, this conflict resolves in postexposure public and private conformity (Cc), as the influencee is freed from her or his conflict. In symbols, disinhibitory contagion can be represented as: $Ic \rightarrow Cc$.

A second possible weakness of the double diamond model concerns whether the model is most accurately conceptualized as (a) a model of social influence *responses* versus (b) a model of social influence *strategies*. Actually, it is both. If one is considering a single episode of influence between a source and a target, the

model is clearly one of social responses. However, if one is considering multiple episodes of reciprocal influence between source/targets and target/sources, then the model can be accurately conceptualized as a model of social influence strategies.

A third possible weakness concerns the double diamond model's public-private dimension. We have conceptualized and presented the double diamond model as a continuous-response model, yet public-private is a discrete variable. Actually, however, the public-private variable can be conceptualized more accurately as continuous. Presumably, knowledge of an influencee's behaviors or attitudes could run all the way from completely public, where everyone in the world knows the influencee's position, to completely private, where even the influencee is not consciously aware of her or his own position. The notion of something less than complete awareness of one's own attitudes touches on the important topic of *implicit* attitudes, defined as "unconscious automatic associations with an attitude object that are spontaneously triggered when that attitude object, or symbol of that attitude object, is experienced" (MacDonald et al., 2004, p. 86). Perhaps the double diamond model could be extended to provide for implicit attitudes by extending the Wilson, Lindsey, and Schooler (2000) dual attitudes model (*viz.*, explicit vs. implicit) to three levels: explicit public, explicit private, and implicit, thus resulting in a triple diamond model. Herein, with respect to disinhibitory contagion, we considered how a preinfluence mismatch between one's public behaviors and private attitudes could impact the malleability of behavior by an external influence source. In a similar manner, implicit attitudes researchers have investigated how implicit attitudes affect behavior and how they may be responsible for either increased malleability or rigidity, in either public or private attitudes, depending upon the context (e.g., Lun, Sinclair, Whitchurch, & Glenn, 2007; Son Hing, Chung-Yan, & Hamilton, 2008).

A weakness of this article but not of the double diamond model itself is that there are apparently ways that strategic self-anticonformity can manifest itself as an influence tactic other than an influencee that rebels against (anticonforms to) an influencer's strategic self-anticonformity. For example, what if Mr. Benson knew that Shawn respected him? Furthermore, what if Mr. Benson believed that Shawn had average ability but could nevertheless perform in the A- to B+ range if he were not so lazy? Under these conditions, Mr. Benson might self-anticonform by telling Shawn how much he appreciates Shawn's effort and work ethic in his class and that he is expecting big things from him this semester. In this case, cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) would predict that Shawn would start studying harder to reduce the inconsistency between his past performance and Mr. Benson's expectations. Note in this example that Shawn would be conforming to Mr. Benson's strategic self-anticonformity, whereas in the actual case of Shawn and Mr. Benson, Shawn anticonformed to Mr. Benson's self-anticonformity.⁵

Strengths and Future Directions

One strength of the double diamond model is its integrative power, capturing as it does all of the distinctions suggested by the most prominent and important existing models of social response (Models 1-11), but in an explicitly three-dimensional/continuous-response format. Previous theory and research have established at

least seven of the diamond model's pure response possibilities as distinct and theoretically significant: conversion, compliance, independence, paradoxical anticompliance, anticonversion, anticompliance, and disinhibitory contagion. The present analysis extends this work to strategic self-anticonformity (Si), leaving many other pure response possibilities for potential exploration. Future empirical and theoretical work should examine not only strategic self-anticonformity (Si), but also, perhaps, such phenomena as public anticonformity/private conformity (Ac) and public self-anticonformity/private self-anticonformity (Ss). When and under what conditions might such responses occur? What psychological processes might mediate such phenomena?

It is not difficult to imagine circumstances where such behaviors occur. Public anticonformity/private conformity (Ac), for example, is not too different in its structure from paradoxical anticompliance (Ic), where, as indicated, the influencee is persuaded by the influence source at the level of private responding but nevertheless projects disagreement and independence at the public level (e.g., Abrams et al., 1990; Eagly et al., 1981). Public anticonformity/private conformity (Ac) is similar, except that the projected public nonconformity is stronger, entailing anticonformity rather than just independence. Such behavior might occur, for example, if a group member wanted to strongly play the role of the "devil's advocate" within her or his group. Say that a group is considering embarking on a course of action that offers a high payoff if successful but that also entails considerable risk (e.g., the decision by President Kennedy and his advisors to support the Bay of Pigs invasion, see Janis, 1982; or the decision by President Obama to attack and kill Osama Bin Laden at his compound in Pakistan). The group member in question has been persuaded of the course and has conformed privately (c), but before publicly casting her or his final vote of approval, this person publicly anticonforms (A) by disagreeing with, and raising strong objections to, the plan. Thus, we submit, public anticonformity/private conformity (Ac) is one form that devil's advocacy could possibly assume.

Future research should more thoroughly examine strategic self-anticonformity as an interpersonal influence technique. MacDonald et al. (2011) examined participants' self-reports of their use of strategic self-anticonformity compared to three more established techniques (the foot-in-the-door, door-in-the-face, and rejection-then-retreat), but MacDonald et al. did not examine participants' perceptions of the use of such techniques on them by others. Are participants aware that such tactics have been used on them? Does the answer depend upon which technique? How would the techniques compare in this regard? As another example of potential

⁵ In point of fact, this type of strategic self-anticonformity was used on me (PRN) by a graduate professor at Texas Christian University, Saul B. Sells. During my second year of graduate school, Dr. Sells started bragging on me, frequently referring to me as one of his "stellar" graduate students. Dr. Sells' compliments occurred especially when he would introduce me to his many friends and executives in the Dallas/Ft. Worth business community. At the time, I felt like the lowest student on campus and anything but a star. I was not working on any research projects that had really captured my imagination and was only hoping to make grades that would keep me from flunking out. In the absence of a control group, it is hard to say precisely what motivated me. However, I was conscious of the high standards of performance that Dr. Sells always set and held for himself, and I was aware that I did not want to fail to live up to Dr. Sells publicly stated expectations of me.

future research, although MacDonald et al. compared the use of strategic self-anticonformity with three established techniques, Pratkanis (2007) has compiled a list of no less than 107 influence tactics that have been identified and studied. Where might strategic self-anticonformity rank compared to these in terms of the frequency and success of its use?

Considering future theoretical development more specifically, the current article has dealt with self-anticonformity both as a possible response to influence and as a stimulus/compliance tactic when a potential influencer anticipates a resistant/negativistic potential influencee. As a compliance tactic, there are apparently many additional forms, however, that self-anticonformity might assume. These include self-deprecation (MacDonald et al., 2011; Powers & Zuroff, 1988), self-handicapping (Jones & Berglas, 1978), the door-in-the-face technique (Cialdini et al., 1975), stealing an adversary's thunder (Williams, Bourgeois, & Croyle, 1993), and two-sided persuasive communications (e.g., Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949). Although very different, each of these techniques has in common an actor/potential influencer who self-anticonforms by appearing to take a public position contrary to her or his self-interests in the short term only to draw benefits consistent with these same self-interests in the long term (see also Cialdini, 2009, pp. 192–195; Ward & Brenner, 2006). A worthy goal for future theoretical development is to propose a process theory of self-anticonformity, one that might organize and integrate various forms of self-anticonformity, ideally with a single set of explanatory constructs.

Conclusion

The present article advances the social response models literature by developing the double diamond model, a model that is literally a double Cartesian plane and that for the first time, thereby, provides for the critical public-private distinction with respect to continuous-response models. In restructuring and extending the original diamond model, we were able to integrate seven recognized types of social response for the first time in a single model (viz., conversion, compliance, independence, paradoxical anticompliance, anticonversion, anticompliance, and disinhibitory contagion). The addition of compromise to this list (Asch, 1956; Chuang et al., 2012) raises this number to eight, although compromise is not a "pure" response possibility as defined herein. More important, we accommodated and provided a theoretical foundation for a relatively new type of social response and influence technique, strategic self-anticonformity, which may have broad application because of its links with reverse psychology. The double diamond model also provides the framework for the future identification of numerous other new response possibilities whose theoretical and real-world significance are open questions. It is these integrative and generative capacities that most support and argue for the value of the double diamond model as a unified continuous-response model of social influence.

References

Abrams, D., Wetherell, M., Cochrane, S., Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1990). Knowing what to think by knowing who you are: Self-categorization and the nature of norm formation, conformity and group polarization. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 29*, 97–119.

Allen, V. L. (1965). Situational factors in conformity. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 133–175). New York, NY: Academic Press.

Allen, V. L., & Newtonson, D. (1972). Development of conformity and independence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 22*, 18–30.

Allport, F. H. (1934). The J-curve hypothesis of conforming behavior. *Journal of Social Psychology, 5*, 141–183.

Argyle, M. (1957). Social pressure in public and private situations. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 54*, 172–175.

Aronson, J., Blanton, H., & Cooper, J. (1995). From dissonance to disidentification: Selectivity in the self-affirmation process. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68*, 986–996.

Asch, S. (1951). Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments. In H. Guetzkow (Ed.), *Groups, leadership, and men* (pp. 177–190). Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press.

Asch, S. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against a unanimous majority. *Psychological Monographs, 70*(9), Whole No. 416.

Asch, S. (1961). Issues in the study of social influences on judgment. In I. A. Berg & B. M. Bass (Eds.), *Conformity and deviation* (pp. 143–158). New York, NY: Harper.

Baer, R., Hinkle, S., Smith, K., & Fenton, M. (1980). Reactance as a function of actual versus projected autonomy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38*, 416–422.

Baron, R. A., & Kepner, C. R. (1970). Model's behavior and attraction to the model as determinants of adult aggressive behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 14*, 335–344.

Baron, R. S., Vandello, J. A., & Brunzman, B. (1996). The forgotten variable in conformity research: Impact of task importance on social influence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71*, 915–927.

Beck, A. T. (1995). Cognitive therapy: Past, present, and future. In M. J. Mahoney (Ed.), *Cognitive and constructive psychotherapies* (pp. 29–40). New York, NY: Springer.

Berger, P. L., & Luckman, T. (1967). *The social construction of knowledge: A treatise on the sociology of knowledge*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press.

Brehm, J. W. (1966). *A theory of psychological reactance*. New York, NY: Academic Press.

Brehm, J. W., & Mann, M. (1975). Effect of importance of freedom and attraction to group members on influence produced by group pressure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31*, 816–824.

Chuang, S.-C., Cheng, Y.-H., & Hsu, C.-T. (2012). The influence of suggestions of reference groups in the compromise effect. *Journal of Economic Psychology, 33*, 554–565.

Cialdini, R. B. (2009). *Influence: Science and practice* (5th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc.

Cialdini, R. B., Vincent, J. E., Lewis, S. K., Catalan, J., Wheeler, D., & Darby, B. L. (1975). Reciprocal concessions procedure for inducing compliance: The door-in-the-face technique. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31*, 206–215.

Coch, L., & French, J. P. R., Jr. (1948). Overcoming resistance to change. *Human Relations, 1*, 512–532.

Cooley, C. H. (1922). *Human nature and the social order* (rev. ed.). New York, NY: Scribner's. (Original work published 1902)

Cooper, J., & Jones, E. E. (1969). Opinion divergence as a strategy to avoid being miscast. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13*, 23–30.

Crutchfield, R. S. (1962). Conformity and creative thinking. In H. E. Gruber, G. Terrell, & M. Wertheimer (Eds.), *Contemporary approaches to creative thinking* (pp. 120–140). New York, NY: Atherton.

Davis, B. P., & Knowles, E. S. (1999). A disrupt-then-reframe technique of social influence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76*, 192–199.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). *Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior*. New York, NY: Plenum Press.

- Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1995). Human autonomy: The basis for true self-esteem. In M. Kernis (Ed.), *Efficacy, agency, and self-esteem* (pp. 31–49). New York, NY: Plenum Press
- Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2008). Facilitating optimal motivation and psychological well-being across life's domains. *Canadian Psychology, 49*, 14–23. doi:10.1037/0708-5591.49.1.14
- Doms, M., & Van Avermaet, E. (1980). Majority influence, minority influence and conversion behavior: A replication. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16*, 283–292.
- Eagly, A. H., Wood, W., & Fishbaugh, L. (1981). Sex differences in conformity: Surveillance by the group as a determinant of male nonconformity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40*, 384–394.
- Erickson, M. H. (1964). The confusion technique in hypnosis. *The American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 6*, 183–207.
- Erickson, M. H., & Rossi, E. L. (1975). Varieties of double bind. *The American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 17*, 143–157.
- Feshbach, N. D. (1967). Nonconformity to experimentally induced group norms of high-status versus low-status members. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6*, 55–63.
- Festinger, L. (1953). An analysis of compliant behavior. In M. Sherif & M. O. Wilson (Eds.), *Group relations at the crossroads* (pp. 232–256). New York, NY: Harper.
- Festinger, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Festinger, L., & Aronson, E. (1968). Arousal and reduction of dissonance in social contexts. In D. Cartwright & A. Zander (Eds.), *Group dynamics: Research and theory* (3rd ed., pp. 125–136). New York, NY: Harper & Row.
- Frankl, V. E. (1967). *Psychotherapy and existentialism: Selected papers on logotherapy*. New York, NY: Washington Square Press.
- Freedman, J. L., & Fraser, S. C. (1966). Compliance without pressure: The foot-in-the-door technique. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4*, 195–203.
- From Swastika to Thunderbird. (2012). Retrieved from <http://www.45thdivisionmuseum.com/History/SwastikaToThunderbird.html>
- Frye, N. (1982). *The great code: The Bible and literature*. London, England: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch.
- Gerard, H. B. (1954). The anchorage of opinions in face-to-face groups. *Human Relations, 7*, 313–326.
- Goethals, G. R., & Perlstein, A. L. (1978). Level of instigation and model similarity as determinants of aggressive behavior. *Aggressive Behavior, 4*, 115–124.
- Gough, H., & Heilbrun, A. L. (1983). *The Revised Adjective Checklist manual*. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
- Greenberger, D., & Padesky, C. A. (1995). *Mind over mood: Change how you feel by changing the way you think*. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Griskevicius, V., Goldstein, N. J., Mortensen, C. R., Cialdini, R. B., & Kenrick, D. T. (2006). Going along versus going alone: When fundamental motives facilitate strategic (non)conformity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91*, 281–294.
- Halama, P., & Lačná, M. (2011). Personality change following religious conversion: Perceptions of converts and their close acquaintances. *Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 14*, 757–768.
- Harter, S. (2002). Authenticity. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), *Handbook of positive psychology* (pp. 382–394). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Hayhurst, B., Higgins, K., & Nail, P. R. (1988, April). *A preliminary examination of Willis's "s elf-anticonformity."* Paper presented at the meeting of the Oklahoma Psychological Society, Oklahoma.
- Heider, F. (1958). *The psychology of interpersonal relations*. New York: Wiley.
- Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy theory: A theory relating self and affect. *Psychological Review, 94*, 319–340.
- Hodges, B. H., & Geyer, A. L. (2006). A nonconformist account of the Asch experiments: Values, pragmatics, and moral dilemmas. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10*, 2–19.
- Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1987). Social identity and conformity: A theory of referent information influence. In W. Doise & S. Moscovici (Eds.), *Current issues in European social psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 139–182). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Hollander, E. P., & Willis, R. H. (1967). Some current issues in the psychology of conformity and nonconformity. *Psychological Bulletin, 68*, 62–76.
- Holzhausen, K. G., & McGlynn, R. P. (2001). Beyond compliance and acceptance: Influence outcomes as a function of norm plausibility and processing mode. *Group Dynamics, 5*, 136–149.
- Horney, K. (1951). *Neurosis and human growth*. London, England: Routledge.
- Hornsey, M. J., Smith, J. R., & Begg, D. (2007). Effects of norms among those with moral conviction: Counter-conformity emerges on intentions but not behaviors. *Social Influence, 2*, 244–268.
- Hornstein, H. A., Fisch, E., & Holmes, M. (1968). Influence of model's feeling about his behavior and his relevance as a comparison other on observers' helping behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10*, 222–226.
- Hovland, C. I., Lumsdaine, A. A., & Sheffield, F. D. (1949). *Experiments in mass communication*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jahoda, M. (1956). Psychological issues in civil liberties. *American Psychologist, 11*, 234–240.
- Janis, I. L. (1982). *Groupthink* (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Jones, E. E., & Berglas, S. (1978). Control of attributions about the self through self-handicapping strategies: The appeal of alcohol and the role of underachievement. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4*, 200–206.
- Kelman, H. C. (1958). Compliance, identification and internalization: Three processes of attitude change. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2*, 51–60.
- Kernis, M. H., & Goldman, B. M. (2005). From thought and experience to behavior and interpersonal relationships: A multicomponent conceptualization of authenticity. In A. Tesser, J. V. Wood, & D. Stapel (Eds.), *On building, defending, and regulating the self: A psychological perspective* (pp. 31–52). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Knowles, E. S., Butler, S., & Linn, J. A. (2001). Increasing compliance by reducing resistance. In J. Forgas & K. Williams (Eds.), *Social influence: Direct and indirect approaches* (pp. 41–60). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
- Knowles, E. S., & Riner, D. D. (2007). Omega approaches to persuasion: Overcoming resistance. In A. R. Pratkanis (Ed.), *The science of social influence: Advances and future progress*. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Koestner, R., Gingras, I., Abutaa, R., Losier, G. F., Di Dio, L., & Gangé, M. (1999). To follow expert advice when making a decision: An examination of reactive versus reflective autonomy. *Journal of Personality, 67*, 851–872.
- Koestner, R., & Losier, G. F. (1996). Distinguishing reactive versus reflective autonomy. *Journal of Personality, 64*, 465–494.
- Krech, D., Crutchfield, R. S., & Ballachey, E. L. (1962). *Individual in society: A textbook of social psychology*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Larson, J. R. (1977). Evidence for a self-serving bias in the attribution of causality. *Journal of Personality, 45*, 430–441.
- Levy, D. A. (1992). The liberating effects of interpersonal influence: An empirical investigation of disinhibitory contagion. *Journal of Social Psychology, 132*, 469–473.
- Loriedo, C., & Vella, G. (1992). *Paradox and the family system*. New York, NY: Brunner/Mazel.

- Lun, J., Sinclair, S., Whitchurch, E. R., & Glenn, C. (2007). (Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93*, 957–972.
- MacDonald, G., Nail, P. R., & Harper, J. (2011). Do people use reverse psychology? An exploration of strategic self-anticonformity. *Social Influence, 6*, 1–14.
- MacDonald, G., Nail, P. R., & Levy, D. A. (2004). Expanding the scope of the social response context model. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 26*, 77–92.
- May, R. (1981). *Freedom and destiny*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Milgram, S. (1974). *Obedience to authority: An experimental view*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
- Miller, W. R., & Rollnick, S. (1991). *Motivational interviewing: Preparing people to change addictive behavior*. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Miller, W. R., & Rollnick, S. (2002). *Motivational interviewing: Preparing people for change* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Montgomery, R. L. (1992). Social influence and conformity: A transorientational model. In D. Granberg & G. Sarup (Eds.), *Social judgment and intergroup relations: Essays in honor of Muzafer Sherif* (pp. 175–200). New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.
- Moscovici, S., Lage, E., & Naffrechoux, M. (1969). Influence of a consistent minority on the response of a majority in a color perception task. *Sociometry, 32*, 365–379.
- Murray, H. A. (1938). *Explorations in personality*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Nail, P. R. (1986). Toward an integration of some models and theories of social response. *Psychological Bulletin, 100*, 190–206.
- Nail, P. R. (2009). Anticonformity. In J. M. Levine & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of group processes and intergroup relations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Nail, P. R., & MacDonald, G. (2007). On the development of the social response context model: New directions for social influence theory and research. In A. R. Pratkanis (Ed.), *The science of social influence: Advances and future progress* (pp. 193–222). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Nail, P. R., MacDonald, G., & Levy, D. A. (2000). Proposal of a four-dimensional model of social response. *Psychological Bulletin, 126*, 454–470.
- Nail, P. R., & Ruch, G. L. (1992). Social influence and the diamond model of social response: Toward an extended theory of informational influence. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 31*, 171–187.
- Nail, P. R., & Thompson, P. L. (1990). An analysis and empirical demonstration of the concept of self-anticonformity. *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 5*, 151–162.
- Nail, P. R., & Van Leeuwen, M. D. (1993). An analysis and restructuring of the diamond model of social response. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19*, 106–116.
- Nail, P. R., & Van Leeuwen, M. D., & Powell, A. B. (1996). The effectance versus the self-presentational view of reactance: Are importance ratings influenced by anticipated surveillance? *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 11*, 573–584.
- Nemeth, C. J., & Wachtler, J. (1974). Creating the perceptions of consistency and confidence: A necessary condition for minority influence. *Sociometry, 37*, 529–540.
- Packer, D. J., & Miners, C. T. H. (2012). At the first sign of trouble or through thick and thin? When nonconformity is and is not disengagement from a group. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48*, 316–322.
- Peterson, J. B. (1999). *Maps of meaning: The architecture of belief*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Pool, G. J., Wood, W., & Leck, K. (1998). The self-esteem motive in social influence: Agreement with valued majorities and disagreement with derogated minorities. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75*, 967–975.
- Powers, T. A., & Zuroff, D. C. (1988). Interpersonal consequences of overt self-criticism: A comparison with neutral and self-enhancing presentations of self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54*, 1054–1062.
- Pratkanis, A. R. (2007). Social influence analysis: An index of tactics. In A. R. Pratkanis (Ed.), *The science of social influence: Advances and future progress* (pp. 17–82). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Rogers, C. R. (1951). *Client-centered therapy: Its current practice, implications, and theory*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Rohrer, J. H., Baron, S. H., Hoffman, E. L., & Swander, D. V. (1954). The stability of autokinetic judgments. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49*, 595–597.
- Ryan, R. M., & Connell, J. P. (1989). Perceived locus of causality and internalization: Examining reasons for acting in two domains. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57*, 749–761. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.5.749
- Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2006). Self-regulation and the problem of human autonomy: Does psychology need choice, self-determination, and will? *Journal of Personality, 74*, 1557–1586. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2006.00420.x
- Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2008). Self-determination theory and the role of basic psychological needs in personality and the organization of behavior. In O. John, R. Roberts, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (pp. 654–678). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Schlegel, R. J., & Hicks, J. A. (2011). The true self and psychological health: Emerging evidence and future directions. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 5*, 989–1003. doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.004041.x
- Shaw, M. E. (1981). *Group dynamics: The psychology of small group behavior* (3rd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Shaw, M. E., & Costanzo, P. R. (1970). *Theories of social psychology*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Sherif, M. (1935). A study of some social factors in perception. *Archives of Psychology, 27*, 1–60.
- Sinha, I., & Foscht, T. (2007). *Reverse psychology marketing: The death of traditional marketing and the rise of the new "pull" game*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Smith, S., Murphy, D. B., & Wheeler, L. (1964). Relation of intelligence and authoritarianism to behavioral contagion and conformity. *Psychological Reports, 14*, 248.
- Son Hing, L. S., Chung-Yan, G. A., & Hamilton, L. K. (2008). A two-dimensional model that employs explicit and implicit attitudes to characterize prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94*, 971–987.
- Sulloway, F. J. (1996). *Born to rebel: Birth order, family dynamics, and creative lives*. New York, NY: Pantheon.
- Thoreau, H. D. (1966). *Walden*. New York, NY: Norton. (Original work published 1854)
- Ward, A., & Brenner, L. (2006). Accentuate the negative: The positive effects of negative acknowledgment. *Psychological Science, 17*, 959–965.
- Wheeler, L. (1966). Toward a theory of behavioral contagion. *Psychological Review, 73*, 179–192.
- Wheeler, L., & Levine, L. (1967). Observer-model similarity in the contagion of aggression. *Sociometry, 30*, 41–49.
- Wilder, D. A. (1990). Some determinants of the persuasive power of in-groups and out-groups: Organization of information and attribution of independence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59*, 1202–1213.
- Williams, K. D., Bourgeois, M. J., & Croyle, R. T. (1993). The effects of stealing thunder in criminal and civil trials. *Law and Human Behavior, 17*, 597–609.

- Willis, R. H. (1963). Two dimensions of conformity-nonconformity. *Sociometry*, 26, 499–513.
- Willis, R. H. (1965, September). *Descriptive models of social response*. Paper presented at the 73rd Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Chicago, IL.
- Willis, R. H. (1965a). Conformity, independence, and anticonformity. *Human Relations*, 18, 373–388.
- Willis, R. H. (1965b). Social influence, information processing, and net conformity in dyads. *Psychological Reports*, 17, 147–156.
- Willis, R. H., & Hollander, E. P. (1964). An experimental study of three response modes in social influence situations. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 69, 150–156.
- Willis, R. H., & Levine, J. M. (1976). Interpersonal influence and conformity. In B. Seidenberg & A. Snadowsky (Eds.), *Social psychology: An introduction* (pp. 309–341). New York, NY: Free Press.
- Wilson, T. D., Lindsey, S., & Schooler, T. (2000). A model of dual attitudes. *Psychological Review*, 107, 101–126. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.107.1.101
- Wood, A. M., Linley, P. A., Maltby, J., Baliousis, M., & Joseph, S. (2008). The authentic personality: A theoretical and empirical conceptualization and the development of the Authenticity Scale. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, 55, 385–399.
- Wood, W., Pool, G. J., Leck, K., & Purvis, D. (1996). Self-definition, defensive processing, and influence: The normative impact of majority and minority groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 71, 1181–1193.
- Worchel, S., & Brehm, J. W. (1970). Effects of threats to attitudinal freedom as a function of agreement with the communicator. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 14, 18–22.
- Wright, D. B., Mathews, S. A., & Skagerberg, E. M. (2005). Social recognition memory: The effect of other people's responses for previously seen and unseen items. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied*, 11, 200–209.

Received August 13, 2012

Revision received October 26, 2012

Accepted October 30, 2012 ■

ORDER FORM

Start my 2013 subscription to *Review of General Psychology* ISSN: 1089-2680

___ \$67.00	APA MEMBER/AFFILIATE	_____
___ \$111.00	INDIVIDUAL NONMEMBER	_____
___ \$486.00	INSTITUTION	_____
	<i>In DC and MD add 6% sales tax</i>	_____
	TOTAL AMOUNT DUE	\$ _____

Subscription orders must be prepaid. Subscriptions are on a calendar year basis only. Allow 4-6 weeks for delivery of the first issue. Call for international subscription rates.



AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION

SEND THIS ORDER FORM TO

American Psychological Association
Subscriptions
750 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20002-4242

Call **800-374-2721** or 202-336-5600
Fax **202-336-5568** :TDD/TTY **202-336-6123**
For subscription information,
e-mail: **subscriptions@apa.org**

Check enclosed (make payable to APA)

Charge my: Visa MasterCard American Express

Cardholder Name _____

Card No. _____ Exp. Date _____

Signature (Required for Charge)

Billing Address

Street _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Daytime Phone _____

E-mail _____

Mail To

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

APA Member # _____

GPR13